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I.

INTRODUCTION

The law of sovereign immunity in Missouri has its source in numerous
statutes and cases. A cursory examination of these sources reveals a confusing
pattern of rules and exceptions which have been the subject of repeated
amendments and reinterpretations by both the legislature and the courts.
This Comment attempts to present these rules and exceptions in a systematic
manner. The objective is to provide a framework for applying current Missouri law of sovereign immunity in tort cases.'
II.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The starting point in this analysis is Section 537.600 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes. 2 This statute provides that "such sovereign or governmental
tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to September 12,
1977 ....
shall remain in full force and effect . . . ." subject to certain exceptions. 3 Thus, sovereign immunity in Missouri is a statutory-common law
1. The scope of this comment is limited to the immunity of state and local
governmental entities from tort liability under Missouri law in Missouri courts. Questions of whether these entities enjoy sovereign immunity in actions brought under
federal law, in federal court or in other state courts are beyond the scope of this
comment.
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985).
3. Id.
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hybrid: its existence is affirmed by statute, yet its definition must be gleaned
from pronouncements of the courts. Therefore, in order to apply the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in a particular case,4 one must look to both statutory
and common law principles for direction.
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985) provides:
1. Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common
law in this state prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived,
abrogated or modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain
in full force and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from
liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omissions
is hereby expressly waived in the following instances:
(1) Injuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor
vehicles or motorized vehicles within the course of their employment;
(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous
condition at the time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted
from the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created
a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury which
was incurred, and that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the course of his
employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect
against the dangerous condition. In any action under this subdivision wherein a plaintiff alleges that he was damaged by the negligent, defective or dangerous design of a highway or road, which
was designed and constructed prior to September 12, 1977, the
public entity shall be entitled to a defense which shall be a complete
bar to recovery whenever the public entity can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged negligent, defective, or
dangerous design reasonably complied with highway and road design standards generally accepted at the time the road or highway
was designed and constructed.
2. The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified in
subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1 of this section are absolute waivers
of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations whether or not the
public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary capacity and
whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability insurance for tort.
This statute represents the legislative response to Jones v. State Highway Comm'n,
557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). In Jones, the Missouri Supreme Court joined
a growing number of state courts to reject the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See
id. at 227 n.1 (list of 30 other jurisdictions which had abrogated the doctrine of
sovereign immunity prior to Jones). The court refused to apply the doctrine in Jones
and in three other cases decided the same day: Prewitt v. Parkway School Dist., 557
S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Wheeler v. St. Clair County Hosp. Dist., 557
S.W.2d 233 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); and State ex rel. Racer v. Richardson, 557 S.W.2d
235 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). With the exception of these four cases, the court's ruling
was made prospective in application from August 15, 1978. Jones, 557 S.W.2d at
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Section 537.600 also indicates the general parameters of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. First, the doctrine applies only in suits against governmental entities.' As elementary as this may sound, it is a point sometimes
missed by practioners, as demonstrated by cases brought against public officials in which sovereign immunity defenses are advanced. 6 If the defendant
is a public official rather than a public entity, the suit may be barred by
official immunity. However, this doctrine is distinct from sovereign immunity
7
in both its application and rationale.

231. The court settled on this postponed prospective application of the holding "[i]n
order that an orderly transition be made, that adequate financial planning take place,
that governmental units have time to adjust their practices and that the legislature
be afforded an opportunity to consider the subject in general .

. . ."

Id. In the 1978

legislative session, Missouri lawmakers approved Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1978).
This prevented the application of the Jones ruling in any other case.
For an explanation of the sources of pre-1977 sovereign immunity law in Missouri, see O'Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975). Judge Finch's dissenting opinion in O'Dell provided
the blueprint for the majority opinion in Jones. Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 228.
5. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.1 (Supp. 1985) (referring to "immunity of
the public entity"). The question of what constitutes a "public entity" is apparently
well settled, as no recent cases discuss this issue. The early cases which considered this
question took a broad view of public entities. See, e.g., Reardon v. St. Louis County,
36 Mo. 555, 562-63 (1865) (entities "created by the Legislature for the purposes of
public policy" enjoy sovereign immunity). Thus, sovereign immunity has been extended
to all types of public bodies including not only the state, counties, and municipalities,
but also: drainage districts, school boards, county hospitals, state university boards
of curators, special road districts, and state agencies. See, e.g., Kanagawa v. State of
Missouri, 685 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Todd v. Curators of Univ. of Mo.,
347 Mo. 460, 147 S.W.2d 1063 (1941); Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 222, 229
S.W. 1051, 1055 (1921); Lamar v. Bolivar Special Road Dist., 201 S.W. 890 (Mo. 1918);
Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 (1869) (case involving city hospital); Reardon
v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555 (1865); Gabbett v. Pike County Memorial Hosp.,
675 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Arnold v. Worth County Drainage Dist., 209
Mo. App. 220, 222, 234 S.W. 349, 350 (1921) (as an arm of the state, a drainage
district "is no more liable for negligence than would be the state").
6. E.g., Spearman v. University City Pub. School Dist., 617 S.W.2d 68, 69
(Mo. 1981) (defendant asserted sovereign immunity as a defense to claims made
against public school instructors); Newson v. City of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 487,
490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (error for trial court to dismiss action against firefighter
on grounds of sovereign immunity).
7. Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); see also
Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 294-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishing the two doctrines); Newson v. City of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 487, 490
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, protects only
the body politic-the government, itself-from suits in tort and not the conduct of
the public official-employee.").
In the recent case of Gavan v. Madison Memorial Hosp., 700 S.W.2d 124, 12728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), the court makes the following succinct statement of the law
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Second, Section 537.600 indicates that sovereign immunity applies only
in tort actions where the plaintiff is seeking money damages. 8 Suits for declaratory or injunctive relief are not barred by this doctrine. 9

of official immunity in Missouri:
Official immunity, the insulation of a public officer from tort liability depends upon whether the act is discretionary or ministerial; if discretionary,
the official is immune, but if ministerial, he is subject to liability for negligent
performance. Ministerial duties of public officials are those of a clerical
nature performed in obedience to mandate without exercise of judgment and
therefore are not immune to suit.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted) (citing Smith v. Lewis, 669 S.W.2d 558, 563
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) and State ex rel. Eli Lilly v. Gaertner, 619 S.W.2d 761, 765
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981)).
8. As noted above, Mo. Rav. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985) is the basis for
sovereign immunity in Missouri, and it "relates only to tort immunity." Gavan v.
Madison Memorial Hosp., 700 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
As in other tort actions, sovereign immunity bars actions against state and local
governmental entities to recover for property damage allegedly caused by nuisance
or negligence. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Mo.
1964); Mattingly v. St. Louis County, 569 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
However, if the plaintiff states his claim as an action to recover for an inverse
condemnation, i.e. an unconstitutional taking of his property, it will not be barred
by sovereign immunity. Mattingly, 569 S.W.2d at 252.
Sovereign immunity will not bar contract actions against governmental entities.
V.S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. 1972) ("[W]hen the state
enters into a validly authorized contract, it lays aside whatever privilege of sovereign
immunity it otherwise possesses and binds itself to performance, just as any private
citizen would do by so contracting."); Crain v. Missouri State Empl. Retirement Sys.,
613 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("[W]hen a statute provides a benefit or
awards a contract, the requisite waiver of immunity from suit to enforce the benefit
or contract is inferred.").
An additional consideration which should be noted is that statutory provisions
granting a governmental entity the power to "sue and be sued" do not abrogate the
entity's immunity to tort liability. State ex rel. New Liberty Hosp. Dist. v. Pratt, 687
S.W.2d 184, 186-87 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). Such language indicates that the entity
may be sued, for example, by creditors. However, a statute will abrogate tort immunity only if it explicitly so states. Id.
9. See, e.g., Regal-Tinneys Grove Special Road Dist. v. Fields, 552 S.W.2d
719, 722 (Mo. 1977) (en banc) ("A declaratory judgment action provides an appropriate method of determining controversies concerning construction of statutes and
powers and duties of governmental agencies thereunder .

. . .");

Rowland v. City of

St. Louis, 327 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (upholding the issuance of a declaratory judgment against the City of St. Louis and the city's mayor and license
collector).
There are special considerations which apply to the issuance of injunctions against
a governmental entity or official. See, e.g., Albright v. Fisher, 164 Mo. 56, 64 S.W.
106 (1901) (discussing the issue of separation of powers and denying an injunction
against a municipal legislative body); May Dept. Stores v. County of St. Louis, 607
S.W.2d 857, 870-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (examining issues to be considered in grant-
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If a case falls within these general parameters, i.e. if it is a tort action
for damages against a governmental entity, the defendant is presumed to be
immune 0 from liability and from the inconvenience of defending itself in
the suit." It is then incumbent on the plaintiff to establish that one of the
exceptions to sovereign immunity applies; otherwise a motion to dismiss by
2
the defendant should be sustained.'
ing or denying injunctive relief against the County Council of St. Louis County).
However, such cases are not subject to dismissal upon a general assertion of sovereign
immunity by the defendant. Cf. Carson v. Sullivan, 284 Mo. 353, 361, 223 S.W. 571,
574 (1920) (en banc) (state officials are amenable to suits for injunctive relief in
Missouri); see also Fratcher, Sovereign Immunity in Probate Proceedings,31 Mo. L.
REv. 127, 131 (1966) ("[A]n injunction against a threatened unlawful seizure of
property by state officers usually may be secured without the consent of the state to
the maintenance of the suit.").
10. In Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc), the court held that "henceforth, so far as governmental responsibility for torts
is concerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity." This abrogated the
longstanding rule to the contrary. Id. When the legislature reinstated the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, it did so by relying on the common law, as it existed prior to
Jones. Thus, the rule under Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 is now immunity, and liability
is the exception. See Bartley v. Special School Dist., 649 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc).
11. State ex rel. Mo. Dept. of Agriculture v. McHenry, 687 S.W.2d 178, 181
(Mo. 1985) (en banc). Because a defendant who is protected by immunity is immune
from both liability and from suit, he may challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss
immediately by seeking a writ of prohibition against the trial judge. Id. at 184.
12. See State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, 581 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Mo. 1979). It
should be noted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity as established by Sections 537.600 is not the only protection from tort liability which the state enjoys.
The Missouri courts also apply the "public duty" rule which protects the government
and public officials from liability "for injuries or damages sustained by particular
individuals resulting from breach by the officers of a duty owed the general public."
Berger v. City of Univ. City, 676 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); see also Sherrill
v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 663-69 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Jamierson v. Dale, 670
S.W.2d 195, 196-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (public duty rule applied in cases against
public officials).
The public duty rule is conceptually distinct from the doctrine of sovereign
immunity: the former prevents the plaintiff from establishing the requisite elements
of a tort claim, while the latter doctrine acts as a bar to an otherwise sufficient cause
of action. This is illustrated by Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d
376 (1969). In Massengill, the Arizona court allowed the defendant to successfully
assert the public duty rule as a defense, although the court had previously rejected
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 520-21, 456 P.2d at 378-79. (Arizona later
rejected the public duty rule. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982)).
Since both theories shield the government from liability, some courts have concluded that the public duty rule is merely another form of sovereign immunity. See
Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976) ("'[T]he duty to all, duty to noone' doctrine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity ...."); Commerical Carrier

Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979) (The "efficacy of
[the public duty rule] is dependent on the continuing vitality of the doctrine of
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EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Common Law Exception: The GovernmentalProprietaryDistinction

In the 1869 case of Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis,"a the Missouri Supreme Court determined whether the St. Louis City Hospital could be held
liable for the injuries of a non-paying patient who allegedly received negligent
care. The court held that the action could not be maintained. The basis for
its holding was a rule, adopted from cases in other jurisdictions,' 4 which
provides that where the
officer or servant of a municipal corporation is in the exercise of a power
conferred upon the corporation for its private benefit, and injury ensues
from the negligence or misfeasance of such officer or servant, the corporation is liable, as in the case of private corporations or parties; but when
the acts or omissions complained of were done or omitted in the exercise
of a corporate franchise for the public good, and not for private corporate
advantage, then the corporation is not liable ....1
The acts which the Murtaugh court described as being for the "private benefit" of a municipal corporation are more commonly referred to as "proprietary" or "corporate" functions.' 6 The latter type of municipal acts, those
performed "for the public good," are generally called "governmental" funcsovereign immunity."). However, under Missouri law the two doctrines remain distinct. Thus, although one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity discussed in this
comment may apply in a particular case, the action may still be barred by the public
duty rule.
For example, in Christine H. v. Derby Liquor Store, 703 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985), the court upheld the dismissal of tort claims against a police officer and
his employer, the City of Kirkwood, on the basis of the public duty rule. Both claims
arose from the allegedly negligent omissions of the police officer. One of the appellant's arguments opposing the dismissal of her claim against the city was that since
the city had purchased liability insurance, it had waived its sovereign immunity under
Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.185 (1978) (this statute is discussed infra notes 102-11 and
accompanying text). However, the court explained that "before a municipality may
be held liable under § 71.185 there must be liability as in cases of other torts, and
[because of the public duty rule] the facts pled by appellant do not support tort
liability." 703 S.W.2d at 89.
13. 44 Mo. 479 (1869).
14. The court cited cases from New York, Virginia, California, Alabama,
Louisiana and Kentucky which applied the rule. Id. at 480-81.
15. Id. at 480.
16. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.23, .24 (3d. ed. 1984).
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tions.' 7 The distinction drawn by the Missouri Supreme Court in Murtaugh
is still applied by the Missouri courts: a municipality is not shielded by
sovereign immunity in cases arising from the exercise of a proprietary function, but actions involving torts arising from the performance of governmental functions by a municipality will be barred by sovereign immunityprovided none of the statutory exceptions to the doctrine apply.' 8
The exception to sovereign immunity for proprietary acts is thus easily
articulated.' 9 However, as the Missouri Supreme Court observed in State ex
rel. Allen v. Barker,20 "[c]haritably, it has been said that the line between
the functions is not clearly defined." '2' Indeed, the cases in which the distinction has been drawn provide very little guidance on why a particular act
should be considered proprietary or governmental, and there is no readily
apparent pattern to these decisions.22 Therefore, as a practical matter, the
only way for an attorney to determine with any degree of certainty whether
refer to Missouri cases which have
an act is proprietary or governmental is to
23
classified the particular act in question.
17. See supra note 16; see also Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39,
44 (Mo. 1960); Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 295 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
18. See, e.g., Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. 1960);
Larabee v. City of Kansas City, 697 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Ashlock
v. City of Herculaneum, 670 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Oberkramer v.
City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Davis v. City of St.
Louis, 612 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
19. See Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1960) ("It is
easy to state the general rule .... The great difficulty is in the application of the

rule to particular facts.").
20. 581 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1979).
21. Id. at 824.
22. In reinstating the pre-1977 common law version of sovereign immunity in
Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985) probably prolonged the existence
of this exception. The governmental-proprietary distinction has been assailed as "nebulous" in Gabbett v. Pike County Memorial Hosp., 675 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984), and Sanchez v. Missouri Div. of Youth Servs., 672 S.W.2d 164, 165
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984). It also has been criticized for causing "the anomolous situation
that a plaintiff's right of recovery for the same tortious conduct depended on whether
the tortfeasor was a municipality or a political subdivision such as a county ......
McConnell v. St. Louis County, 655 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Given
the judicial hostility toward this exception, it is likely that it would have quietly
slipped into extinction had the legislature not, perhaps inadvertently, assured its
continued viability by freezing the common law of sovereign immunity at its preJones stage of development.
23. Determinations of what is proprietary and what is governmental vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus, cases from other states do not necessarily indicate
how the Missouri courts will categorize a particular act. For example, the Missouri
Courts have held that the operation of a city hospital is a governmental act. Murtaugh
v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 (1869). However, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled
that this act is proprietary in nature. See Stolp v. City of Arkansas City, 180 Kan.
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Although some generalizations can be stated about the types of acts for
which a municipality may be held liable, there are problems in applying these
rules to the facts of a given case. For example, the Missouri courts have
consistently held that municipalities are liable for injuries caused by the
negligent construction, repair, and maintenance of their streets. 24 On the other
hand, directing the flow of traffic, which includes determining where to place
traffic signs, is considered a governmental function, and thus protected by
by
sovereign immunity.25 The overlap between these two rules is illustrated
27
26
two cases: Watson v. Kansas City and German v. Kansas City.
In Watson, the plaintiff was injured when she drove through an unmarked T intersection and down the steep, rocky enbankment which lay
beyond it.28 The Missouri Supreme Court held that Kansas City was not
liable for failing to place warning signs at the accident site. 29 The court
remarked that "there can be no reasonable argument concerning the validity
of the proposition that the placing (or failure to place) of a sign. . . to warn
that the intersection in question was a T intersection is a form of traffic
regulation, direction, or control, and hence a governmental function." 0
In the German case, however, the supreme court ruled that the city was
not protected by sovereign immunity in a case stemming from the failure to
adequately mark a stretch of highway as two-way.3 The roadway in German
was under construction at the time of the accident, and on the basis of this
32
fact, the court distinguished the case from Watson.
197, 203-04, 303 P.2d 123, 128 (1956). Conversely, the Kansas courts hold that the
operation of city parks is a governmental function, while the Missouri courts classify
this as a proprietary act. Compare Harper v. City of Topeka, 92 Kan. 11, 15, 139
P. 1018, 1020 (1914), with Teaney v. City of St. Joseph, 520 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975).
24. Myers v. City of Palmyra, 355 S.W.2d 17, 18-19 (Mo. 1962). As the
Meyers court noted, some Missouri cases characterize this function as proprietary,
others as a governmental function (which is an exception to the general rule that a
municipality is immune for tortious performance of governmental acts), and still
others use the term "ministerial" to describe this function and explain why a city
has no immunity in cases concerning this duty. Id. Despite this confusion over terminology, it is clear that "to this activity the doctrine of immunity from liability for
torts does not apply." Id. at 19.
25. Watson v. Kansas City, 499 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. 1973).
26. Id.
27. 512 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
28. Watson, 499 S.W.2d at 516.
29. Id. at 517.
30. Id. at 518.
31. German, 512 S.W.2d at 146.
32. Id. at 144. In his concurring opinion, Judge Seiler revealed that he was
"unable to perceive any real distinction" between the German and Watson cases, but
in his judgment, "the view adopted in the present case is the more enlightened and
sensible one ..... " Id. at 148. Judge Holman, the author of the Watson opinion

also failed to see a distinction between the two cases, and dissented. Id. at 149.
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Langhammer v. City of Mexico33 provides another illustration of the
overlap between the duty to maintain streets and a governmental function.
In this case, Mrs. Langhammer was injured when the road surface in the
city dump gave way and "she was precipitated into the glowing embers
beneath. '34 There is considerable authority that maintaining a dump is a
governmental function, as the court noted. 35 However, the court held that
a jury could reasonably find that the 'circles,' 'loops' and leveled areas
[through the dump] constituted a city maintained 'way' with consequent
liability for their negligent maintenance even though they came into existence
and were maintained as a part of36the city's exercise of the governmental
function of operating a city dump.
The courts have also had difficulty drawing a distinction between a city's
proprietary and governmental acts in cases involving street cleaning. Early
cases held that "the keeping of streets clean and free from filth and noxious
refuse is a governmental function. ' 37 However, in Myers v. City of Palmyra, 8 the supreme court concluded that the objective of removing snow
and ice from the streets is to improve the flow of traffic-a proprietary
function. On the basis of the Myers case, the Missouri Court of Appeals in
Davis v. City of St. Louis 39 held that cleaning the streets to remove cinders
is also a proprietary act, explaining that "[s]treet sweeping is primarily an
act conducted by municipalities to maintain our thoroughfares open for the
unrestricted flow of traffic." 40
One area where the courts have generally avoided inconsistency is in
cases concerning parks. As explained in Teaney v. City of St. Joseph,4'
"[w]hile there is a division of authority among the states as to whether or
not maintaining a park falls under the governmental or proprietary function

33. 327 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1959).
34. Id. at 834.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 836.
37. Hayes v. City of Kansas City, 362 Mo. 368, 371, 241 S.W.2d 888, 890
(1951) (citing Cassidy v. City of St. Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 152 S.W. 306 (1912));
Berhmann v. City of St. Louis, 273 Mo. 578, 201 S.W. 547, 547 (1918).
38. 355 S.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Mo. 1962).
39. 612 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
40. Id. at 815; accordAshlock v. City of Herculaneum, 670 S.W.2d 131 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984). It can be argued that Davisand Ashlock conflict with Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 537.600 (Supp. 1985). The statute provides that the law of sovereign immunity is
the law which "existed at common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977."
In other words, the statute freezes the common law of sovereign immunity at its preJones stage of development. However, the holdings of Davis and Ashlock are inconsistent with the pre-Jones common law. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41. 520 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
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of the city, Missouri has long held that it falls within the proprietary function." ' 42 However, in two cases involving violence by mobs and individuals
in parks, sovereign immunity was successfully raised as a bar to the actions.43
In these cases, the failure of the city to maintain order was held to be a
governmental function, since the city's actions were an exercise of its police
power.M
The Missouri courts are also consistent in categorizing the operation of
city hospitals 45 and police departments46 as governmental functions. The Missouri courts are equally consistent in categorizing actions arising from the
construction, maintenance, and operation of sewers 47 and city owned utility
companies4 as proprietary acts.
In addition to the difficulty of determining which acts are governmental
and which are proprietary, there is also confusion over what governmental
entities are capable of performing both types of functions. Much of this
confusion among the Missouri courts in recent years can be traced to the
supreme court's opinion in State ex rel. Allen' v. Barker.49 In Barker, the
court concluded that the governmental-proprietary distinction "is still viable
and must be applied."3 0 The court then noted that it knew of no decisions
which categorized the particular function at issue in the case-the operation
of a radio station by a school district." The court held that the trial court's
dismissal of the action against the school district on the basis of sovereign
immunity was not an abuse of discretion. However, it added that the plaintiff
should be allowed to amend the petition "to aver sufficient facts to bring
the cause within the [proprietary function] exception to the general doctrine
5' 2
of immunity."
The Missouri Courts of Appeals, not surprisingly, interpreted Barker as
indicating that school districts were capable of performing proprietary func42. Id. at 708.
43. See Wasserman v. Kansas City, 471 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1971) (en banc);
Healy v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 619, 211 S.W. 59 (1919).
44. Wasserman v. Kansas City, 471 S.W.2d 199, 201-02 (Mo. 1971) (en banc);
Healy v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 619, 626-27, 211 S.W. 59, 61 (1919).
45. See State ex rel. New Liberty Hosp. Dist. v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 186
(Mo. 1985).
46. See Ozark Silver Exchange v. City of Rolla, 664 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
47. See St. Joseph Light v. Kaw Valley Tunneling, 589 S.W.2d 260, 266-67
(Mo. 1979) (en banc).
48. See Lockhart v. Kansas City, 351 Mo. 1218, 1221-22, 175 S.W.2d 814,
815-16 (Mo. 1944).
49. 581 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
50. Id. at 825.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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tions.5 3 This conclusion is clearly implied by the case, although the court did
not discuss this point. Since earlier cases had rejected the application of the
governmental-proprietary distinction in all cases except those against munic-4
ipalities, Barker's apparent extension of the distinction was very significant.1
The courts of appeals have dutifully followed this interpretation of Barker and expanded the application of the governmental-proprietary distinction
despite the difficulties involved. 5 It now appears, however, that the supreme
court has discovered the full import of its opinion and has resolved to curtail
its application. There are indications that, notwithstanding Barker, the court
will continue to apply the governmental-proprietary distinction only in cases
against municipalities. This retreat from Barker is evident in two recent

v. Pratt6 and State
supreme court cases: State ex rel. New Liberty Hospital
7
McHenry.
ex rel. Missouri Dept. of Agriculture v.
In Pratt, the court stated that "[tihe traditional rule . . .permits the
application of the governmental-proprietary distinction (and the preclusion
of immunity in the latter circumstance) only as to municipalities.""8 In a
footnote, the court explained that it is cognizant of the interpretations of
Barker arrived at by the courts of appeals. However, it refused to affirm
either the "existence or the propriety of such a deviation from the traditional
rule." 5 9 But in McHenry, which was handed down on the same day, the
court stated unequivocally (although also in a footnote), "A school district
enjoys sovereign immunity, and there is no need to invoke the proprietarygovernmental analysis.'"'6
53. See Allen v. Salina Broadcasting, 630 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Johnson v. Carthell, 631 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Fowler v.
Board of Regents, 637 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also Gabbett v.
Pike County Memorial Hosp., 675 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that the governmental-proprietary distinction applies to municipalities and school
districts, but not citing State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, 581 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1979) (en
banc)).
54. See McConnell v. St. Louis County, 655 S.W.2d 654, 655-56 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983). McConnell notes the Missouri Courts of Appeals interpretation of Barker, and criticizes the Barker case for ignoring the line of pre-Jones cases which held
that the governmental-proprietary distinction was applicable only to municipalities.
Id. at 656. The McConnell case also points out that Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1978)
reinstated sovereign immunity as it existed prior to Jones v. State Highway Comm'n,
557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977). McConnell, 655 S.W.2d at 656. On this basis, the
McConnell court rejected the suggestion that it extend the governmental-proprietary
distinction to a situation not indicated by the pre-Jones cases. Id.
55. See Allen v. Salina Broadcasting, 630 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (describing the difficulty of applying this distinction).
56. 687 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
57. 687 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
58. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d at 186.
59. Id. at 186 n.1.
60. McHenry, 687 S.W.2d at 182 n.5.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

11

MISSOURI
LAWVol.
REVIEW
Missouri Law Review,
51, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5

[Vol. 51

Thus, McHenry and Pratt indicate that in the future the supreme court
will not uphold the application of the governmental-proprietary distinction
in cases against school districts. It should be noted, however, that the language from these cases which is cited above is clearly dicta.61 Nevertheless,
these comments are a good indication of the court's thinking on this topic.
This much can be said with certainty: the governmental-proprietary distinction is applicable to municipalities and, with the exception of school
districts, it is clearly inapplicable to cases against other public entities. The
remaining question which must be addressed in connection with this exception
is: what constitutes a municipality?
As the Missouri Supreme Court recently stated in State ex rel. St. Louis
2
Housing Authority v. Gaertner,6
"the term 'municipality' may have different
meanings in different contexts. ' 63 One approach in applying the governmental-proprietary distinction is to ask: What powers has the legislature given
the entity? For example, in St. Louis Housing Authority, the court noted
that "by statute the Housing Authority is granted only power to exercise
'public and essential governmental functions.' "64 Thus, although the Housing
Authority is a "municipality" for some purposes,6 it is incapable of performing a proprietary function.
The governmental-proprietary distinction provides the basis for the only
common law exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity. There are
no equitable exceptions to the doctrine.6 This rule has repeatedly been upheld, even in cases where it was conceded by the court that application of
67
the doctrine would result in injustice to the plaintiff.
61. Neither case was against a school district defendant, and the discussion,
of this issue was not a factor in the outcome of either case. Moreover, both cases
relegated their comments, for the most part, to footnotes, another indication that
this topic was not central to the court's holdings.
62. 695 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1985).
63. Id. at 462.
64. Id.
65. In addition to applying the govermental-proprietary distinction, the court
also evaluated the case under Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.185 (1978). This statute, discussed
infra at notes 104-10 and accompanying text, provides an exception to sovereign
immunity in cases against municipalities which are covered by liability insurance. Like
the common law exception, this statute applies only to municipalities. The court noted
that the St. Louis Housing Authority, the defendant, was held to be a municipality
for purposes of cooperation agreements in St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of
St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 239 S.W.2d 289 (1951) (en banc). Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d at
462. The court concluded that in sovereign immunity contexts "municipality" should
be construed narrowly. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d at 463. Thus, it found § 71.185 to be
inapplicable to the defendant. 695 S.W.2d 460, 462-63.
66. State ex rel. New Liberty v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Mo. 1985).
67. See id. As the court noted in Pratt, "in light of the legislature's reinstatement of sovereign immunity, the question of fairness has been definitively removed from legitimate consideration" in applying the doctrine. Id.
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If a case for damages against a public entity is not removed from the
general rule of immunity by the proprietary function exception, it may still
meet the requirements of a statutory exception to the doctrine. The interrelationship between the common law and statutory exceptions to sovereign

immunity was explained in Delmain v. Meramec Valley R-III School District.68 In Delmain, the court noted that if plaintiffs allege facts which bring
the defendant within one of the statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity,
it is not necessary to also allege facts to bring him within the common law
proprietary function exception. In such a case, the court explained, the failure
defendant was acting in a proprietary capacity is not grounds
to allege that the
69
for dismissal.

B.

Statutory Exceptions: Operations of Motor Vehicles
and Dangerous Conditions of Public Property

There are several statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity. Among
these, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.600 has created the most confusing and perhaps most surprising amount of caselaw. Fortunately, the
legislature's amendments to Section 537.600, which became effective September 28, 1985, overrule much of this caselaw. 70 The statute, as amended,
provides two important exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity:
Subsection 1.(I) waives immunity in actions resulting from the negligent
operation of motorized vehicles by public employees acting within the course
of their employment and Subsection I.(2) creates a limited exception for
injuries caused by dangerous conditions of public property. 7
Although Section 537.600 as originally adopted contained most of the
language found in the current statute 7 2 it lacked a provision now found in
68. 671 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
69. Id. at 417. In addition to establishing that an exception to sovereign
immunity applies, a plaintiff in a tort case against a municipality may also have to
comply with the statutory notice of claim requirements. These statutes apply in actions
"on account of any injuries growing out of any defect or unsafe condition of or on
any bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare, in said city." Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 77.600 (3rd class cities), 79.480 (4th class cities), 81.060 (special charter
cities and towns), 82.210 (constitutional charter cities) (1978). They provide that such
an action may not be maintained unless the plaintiff notifies the mayor in writing,
within ninety days of the injury, and describes the place, time, character and circumstances of the injury and states his intention to claim damages.
70. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985).
71. For the full text of this provision, see supra note 4.
72. The original version of these subsections provided an express waiver of
sovereign immunity for:
(1) Injuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public
employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles within the course
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Subsection 2. This amendment stipulates that the motor vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions are "absolute waivers of sovereign
immunity in all cases within such situations ... whether or not the public
entity is covered by a liability insurance for tort.""
To anyone who is unfamiliar with the pre-1985 interpretations of Section
537.600, its amendment probably seems superfluous. Most of these observers
would probably conclude that the statute in its original form created two
exceptions that were absolute and unrelated to insurance coverage. 74
However, in 1983, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the original version of Section 537.600 must be interpreted in pan materia with
Section 537.610. 7 1 Through a somewhat bewildering reasoning process, the
court determined, in the case of Bartley v. Special School District,76 that the

motor vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions applied only
where the public entity had procured liability insurance. 77 Thus, under this
interpretation, a public entity could avoid liability in these circumstances by
78
simply failing to procure liability insurance.
of their employment;
(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the
plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time
of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition,
that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm
of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a negligent or
wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the
course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity
had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient
time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (1978) (amended 1985). Note that the essential language defining the exceptions has remained unchanged.
73. Id. § 537.600.2. (Supp. 1985).
74. See Bartley v. Special School Dist., 649 S.W.2d 864, 870-74 (Mo. 1983)
(Wasserstrom, Special Judge, dissenting).
75. Id. at 867 (majority opinion).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 870. The courts of appeal were reluctant to apply this holding. See,
e.g., Brown v. Green County, 677 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("While it
plainly appears that plaintiff's petition states a cause of action under § 537.600(2),
because of the recent opinion in Bartley ... we are constrained to conclude other-

wise."); Hohimer v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n, 659 S.W.2d 521, 522
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("This writer agrees with the analysis of legislative intent set
forth in the dissent of Wasserstrom, Sp. J., in the Bartley case .... ").

78. For example, in Sanchez v. Missouri Youth Servs., 672 S.W.2d 164, 165
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the plaintiff "did not, and apparently in good faith could not,
allege defendant possessed liability insurance." Thus, she could not bring her case
within Bartley's interpretation of the dangerous condition of property exception, even
though she had been struck in the head by a sign which fell from the defendant's
building. As a result, the plaintiff in this case, a sixteen month old child who suffered
a fractured skull in the accident, was denied recovery because of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
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Although it can be argued that this somewhat incongruous result did
not reflect the legislature's intention, it was not until 1985 that Missouri
lawmakers took the opportunity to restate Section 537.600. 79 It should be
noted however, that an earlier legislative pronouncement, in an amendment
to Section 34.260,80 may have also been intended to overrule Bartley.,' This
earlier amendment was passed in 1983.82 Thus, it may be significant for
persons bringing cases arising from alleged tortious acts which occurred between 1983 and the effective date of the 1985 amendment to Section 537.600.
To date, only one reported case has considered this possible interpretation of the amendments to Section 34.260. In this case, State ex rel. Mis79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985).
80. Id. § 34.260 (Supp. 1984).
81.

See Barvick, Sovereign Immunity-A Corpse That Will Not Stay Down,

41 J. Mo. BAR 293 (1985) (Barvick concludes that Section 31.260 may have overruled
Bartley). But see Venker, Sovereign Immunity in Missouri: A Different Perspective
on § 34.260, 42 J. Mo. BAR 81 (1986) (Venker concludes that such an interpretation
would violate the Missouri Constitution).

82. The effective date of the amended statute was September 28, 1983. As
amended it provides:
The commissioner of administration may procure on the basis of competitive bids under the provisions of this chapter, motor vehicle, aircraft, and
marine liability insurance covering the operating of state-controlled motor
vehicles, aircraft, and marine vessels by state employees, members of the
Missouri national guard, or agents in the course of their employment, military duties, or the scope of their agency, or for dangerous conditions of
property as defined in section 537.600, RSMo; provided, however that in
lieu of procuring insurance to cover such risks, the commissioner may determine that the state shall self-insure against all or any portion of such
risks. Each department and agency of state government coming within the
provisions of sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall provide the commissioner with
such information regarding the risks to be insured as he deems necessary.
Sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall not apply to the departments and agencies
which on September 28, 1973, provided motor vehicle liability insurance for
their employees who operate state-controlled motor vehicles, aircraft, or
marine vessels in the course of their employment, military duties, or scope
of their agency. The procurement of liability insurance or the adoption of
a plan of self-insurance by the commissioner of administration shall not
limit the express waiver of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations specified therein whether or not the public entity was functioning in
a governmental or proprietarycapacity or whether or not the public entity
is: (1) covered by liability insuranceor a self-insuranceplan or (2) uninsured.
In the other situationsspecified in this section, and in such other situations
of tort liability for which insurance or a self-insurance plan is obtained or
provided, sovereign immunity is waived to the maximum amount of, and
for the purposescovered by, such policy of insuranceor self-insuranceplan,
provided that sovereign immunity in instances other than those specified in
subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 537.600, RSMo, shall be retained in the
event of [sic] the publicentity elects not to procure insuranceor to implement
a self-insurance plan under the provisions of section 53Z620 to 537.650
RSMo.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 34.260 (Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
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souri Highway and TransportationCommission v. Appelquist,83 the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Southern District, agreed that it was possible to read the
new Section 34.260 as "an unconditional waiver of sovereign immunity in
the instances specified in subsections '(1)' and '(2)' of § 537.600 RSMo
1978." 1 However, the court also pointed out that the "mysteriously worded
and difficult to fathom""s language of the amendment conflicts with the clear
was not intended to waive
statement in another statute 6 that Section 34.260
87
or abrogate the state's sovereign immunity.
The court declined to resolve this conflict, although it suggested that the
amendments to Section 34.260 may have repealed the earlier inconsistent
statute by implication. 88 The court was able to avoid ruling on this issue
since the auto collision which gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action
occurred before the effective date of the amended statute. The court found
that the statute does not operate retroactively, and thus was not applicable
in the case at hand. 89
Whatever the effect of Section 34.260 on torts committed between 1983
and 1985, it is now clear that, at least for torts committed after September
28, 1985, the dangerous condition of property and motor vehicle exceptions
apply regardless of insurance coverage.? Aside from this issue, there has
been little litigation over the parameters of the motor vehicle exception. 9'
The dangerous condition of property exception, on the other hand, has
spawned several appellate arguments over its exact meaning.92
698 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
Id.at 894.
Id.
Id. The court was referring to Mo. REv. STAT. § 34.275 (Supp. 1978).
87. Mo. REv. STAT. § 34.275 (Supp. 1978) provides: "Nothing in sections
34.260 to 34.275 is intended to nor shall it be construed as a waiver of sovereign
immunity or the acknowledgement or creation of any liability on the part of the state
for personal injury, death or property."
88. 698 S.W.2d at 894.
89. Id. at 894-95.
90. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985). It is unclear, however, whether
the amount of liability under these exceptions is limited by Section 537.610. For a
discussion of this issue, see infra notes 112-37 and accompanying text.
91. However, in one case against a school district and a school bus driver,
the plaintiff argued that the actions of the driver (who allegedly participated in a
fight between his passengers) fell within this exception. Johnson v. Carthell, 631
S.W.2d 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The court noted that there were no cases construing
the phrase "operation of motor vehicles" as it is used in § 537.600(1). Nevertheless,
after examining cases construing the similar language of Mo. REv. STAT. § 304.010
(1978), the court concluded that the "operation of a motor vehicle includes nearly
any activity that deals specifically with the motor vehicle." 631 S.W.2d at 927. The
connection between the defendant's actions and the bus arose only because the fight
occurred on the bus. Therefore, his actions "were not part of the 'operation' of a
vehicle" and the case did not come within the exception to sovereign immunity. Id.
92. E.g., Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1985); Delmain v. Meramec
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Three cases which interpreted the dangerous condition of property exception concerned criminal acts by third parties. 93 Public property was involved in these cases, but only in a tangential way. For example, in Kanagawa
v. State,9 4 the plaintiff was injured by a convict who escaped from a state
penal institution. The plaintiff contended that the circumstances at the facility
which led to the prisoner's escape constituted a dangerous condition of public
property under Section 537.6 10.95 The court, however, rejected this argument
explaining that the dangerous condition of property exception should be
construed narrowly, and that it refers only to "a defect in the physical
condition of public property.1 96 The court concluded that the appellant's
allegations were insufficient to fit within this narrow construction. The court
added that "the facts alleged demonstrate beyond doubt that the escaped
inmate, and not the condition of the state's property, caused appellant's
'97
injuries."
8
the Missouri
Similarly, in Twente v. Ellis FischelState CancerHospital,"
Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's contention that her case fell within
the dangerous condition of property exception. In Twente, the plaintiff alleged that she had been sexually assaulted on the defendant's parking lot.
She maintained that lack of supervision of the parking lot was the dangerous
condition of the defendant's property which resulted in her injuries." The
court, however, denied the plaintiff recovery and stated that "dangerous
condition" as used in Section 537.600 "refers exclusively to some physical
condition upon the property and not other 'conditions."' "'
Kanagawa and Twente illustrate the Missouri courts' narrow reading of
the dangerous condition of property exception. To come within this exception, the plaintiff's injuries must be the direct result of the condition of the
public property. If the tortious acts of third parties intervene in the cause
of the injury, application of this exception may be precluded.
C.

Statutory Exceptions: Insurance Coverage

The final consideration in determining whether the general rule of immunity applies in an action against a public entity is whether the entity has
Valley R-III School Dist., 671 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that "property" as used in Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 refers to both real and personal property);
Twente v. Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp., 665 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Bates
v. State, 664 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
93. Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1985); Twente v. Ellis Fischel
State Cancer Hosp., 665 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Bates v. State, 664 S.W.2d
563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
94. 685 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1985).
95. Id. at 835. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the fences were inadequate and a gate was left unlocked at the prison. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 665 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 12.
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procured insurance. As noted above, insurance coverage is no longer a prerequisite for applying the exceptions established by Section 537.600.10 Insurance coverage, however, remains relevant to the application of sovereign
immunity because of Sections 71.185102 and 537.610103 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes.
101. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
102. Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.185 (1978) provides:
I. Any municipality engaged in the exercise of governmental functions may
carry liability insurance and pay the premiums therefor to insure such municipality and their employees against claims or causes of action for property
damage or personal injuries, including death, caused while in the exercise
of the governmental functions, and shall be liable as in other cases of torts
for property damage and personal injuries including death suffered by third
persons while the municipality is engaged in the exercise of the governmental
functions to the extent of the insurance so carried.
2. In all suits brought against the municipality for tort damages suffered
by anyone while the municipality is engaged in the exercise of governmental
functions, it shall be unlawful for the amount of insurance so carried to be
shown in evidence, but the court shall be informed thereof and shall reduce
any verdict rendered by a jury for an amount in excess of such insurance
to the amount of the insurance coverage for the claim.
103. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610 (1978) provides:
1. The commissioner of administration, through the purchasing division,
and the governing body of each political subdivision of this state, notwithstanding any other provision of law, may purchase liability insurance for
tort claims made against the state or the political subdivision, but the maximum amount of such coverage shall not exceed eight hundred thousand
dollars for all claims arising out of a single occurrence and shall not exceed
one hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a single accident or
occurrence, except for those claims governed by the provisions of the Missouri workmen's compensation law, chapter 287, RSMo, and no amount in
excess of the above limits shall be awarded or settled upon. Sovereign immunity for the state of Missouri and its political subdivisions is waived only
to the maximum amount of and only for the purposes covered by such
policy of insurance purchased pursuant to the provisions of this section and
in such amount and for such purposes provided in any self-insurance plan
duly adopted by the governing body of any political subdivision of the state.
2. The liability of the state and its public entities on claims within the scope
of sections 537.600 to 537.650, shall not exceed eight hundred thousand
dollars for all claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence and shall
not exceed one hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a single
accident or occurrence, except for those claims governed by the provisions
of the Missouri workmen's compensation law, chapter 287, RSMo.
3. No award for damages on any claim against a public entity within the
scope of sections 537.600 to 537.650, shall include punitive or exemplary
damages.
4. If the amount awarded to or settled upon multiple claimants exceeds
eight hundred thousand dollars, any party may apply to any circuit court
to apportion to each claimant his proper share of the total amount limited
by subsection I of this section. The share-apportioned to each claimant shall
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As explained below, Section 71.185 clearly provides that a waiver of
sovereign immunity will result from the purchase of liability insurance by a
municipality.'°4 Section 537.610 may allow for a similar waiver of sovereign
immunity in cases involving municipalities as well as other public entities.'0 5
However, as a result of the legislature's failure to clarify this statute at the
time Section 537.600 was amended,'06 the meaning of Section 537.610 is now
uncertain. The courts have not yet had the opportunity to rule on this issue.
but in light of the amendments to Section 537.600, they should find that
Section 537.610 provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity as a result of
0 7
the purchase of insurance.1
Under Section 71.185 municipalities that purchase liability insurance waive
their immunity from tort claims arising from the exercise of governmental
functions. The liability for such torts is limited to "the extent of the insurance
so carried."'0 8 Thus, to bring his case within this exception, a plaintiff must
plead and prove' °9 that the defendant is a municipality within the meaning
of Section 71.185,110 and that the defendant was covered by liability insurance
for the exercise of the governmental function which caused the plaintiff's
injuries."'
be in the proportion that the ratio of the award or settlement made to him
bears to the aggregate awards and settlements for claims arising out of the
accident or occurrence, but the share shall not exceed one hundred thousand
dollars.
104. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
105. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.610.1 (1978) pertains to "tort claims made against
the state or the political subdivision [of this state]." Section 537.610.2 applies to
"[t]he liability of the state and its public entities." Thus, this statute is applicable to
all governmental units within the state of Missouri, including municipalities and the
state itself. If this statute is indeed found to create a waiver by insurance, (as this
comment recommends, see infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text) it would have
the effect of superseding Section 71.185. Note that avoiding this result was one of
the majority's reasons for refusing to find a waiver by insurance in Section 537.610
in the Bartley case. See Bartley v. Special School Dist., 649 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
106. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
amendments to Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.
107. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.

108. Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 71.185 (1978).

109. The plaintiff must include in his petition affirmative allegations asserting
that Section 71.185 applies, in order to bring his case within this exception to sovereign
immunity. See Newson v. City of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
110. See supra note 65 (discussing the interpretation of "municipality" under
Section 71.185).
111. It should be noted that if the case involves a proprietary function rather
than a governmental function, Section 71.185 does not apply. However, if that is the
case, the common law proprietary function exception will prevent sovereign immunity from barring the action. See supra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, unlike Section 71.185, the meaning of Section 537.61012
is not entirely clear. This section states that the commissioner of administration and the governing body of each political subdivision of Missouri
have the authority to purchase liability insurance. This section also recites
limits to the tort liability of the state, its political subdivisions, and its public
entities, and provides that "[sjovereign immunity for the state of Missouri
and its political subdivisions is waived only to the maximum amount of and
only for the purposes covered by" their insurance policies or self-insurance
plans. 113
As explained in the foregoing sections of this Comment, Bartley"" held
that this statute merely modifies Section 537.600. According to the Bartley
case, the purchase of liability insurance under this section results in a waiver
of sovereign immunity only where the motor vehicle or dangerous condition
of property exceptions of Section 537.600 also apply. However, the 1985
amendment to Section 537.600 makes it clear that the motor vehicle and
dangerous condition of property exceptions now stand alone, i.e., they may
be invoked regardless of insurance coverage." 5 Thus, there is no question
that to some extent, Bartley has been overruled. Unfortunately, the legislature's changes in Section 537.600 do not include an explanation of what
meaning should now be given to Section 537.610. At least four (and possibly
many more) interpretations can be given to Section 537.610.' 16 Although it
cannot be stated with certainty what course the Missouri courts will follow,
it is the recommendation of this commentator that the fourth possibility
described below be followed, for the reasons explained herein." 7
The first possible interpretation of Section 537.610 in light of the amendments to Section 537.600, is that the older statute (Section 537.610) has been
repealed by implication. Support for this reading of the statute is found in
112. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610 (Supp. 1984). For the full text of this statute,
see supra note 103.
113. Id. The application of Section 537.610 to self-insurance plans is limited
to those which are "duly adopted by the governing body of any political subdivision
of the state" (emphasis added). This indicates that Section 537.610 would not apply
to a self-insurance plan adopted by the state itself. Thus, although an argument can
be made that the State Legal Expense Fund, provided for by Mo. REv. STAT. §§
105.711-.726 (Supp. 1984), is a plan of self-insurance, the existence of this fund
should not trigger the application of Section 537.610.
Moreover, it should be noted that there are strong arguments against the conclusion that the State Legal Expense Fund even qualifies as a self-insurance plan.
The Fund does not carry many of the traditional indicia of plans of self-insurance,
such as the establishment of reserves.
114. Bartley v. Special School Dist., 649 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
115. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
116. Of course, the four interpretations presented herein do not necessarily
represent every possible interpretation of this statute.
117. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
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the new language of Section 537.600, which states that its "express waiver[s]
of sovereign immunity . . . are absolute waivers. '"II It can be argued that
by "absolute," the legislature meant that these waivers are not to be limited
in any way. In other words, Bartley's holding that Section 537.610 limits the
motor vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions has been rejected by the legislature. Therefore, Section 537.610 no longer has any
application-since according to Bartley its sole purpose was to limit the two
exceptions found in Section 537.600. Because the new statute is inconsistent
with Section 537.610, it can be concluded that the older statute had been
repealed by implication.'
This extreme interpretation has an obvious weakness since it is axiomatic
that a repeal by implication is an unfavored statutory interpretation. As the
court observed in Bartley, "[W]here two acts are seemingly incompatible,
they must, if feasible, be so construed that the later act will not operate as
a repealer by implication, since if they are not irreconcilably inconsistent,
both must stand.' ' 20 Thus, if a less extreme interpretation can be supported,
this first possibility must be rejected. And, as explained below, at least three
other, less extreme interpretations exist.
Moreover, this interpretation arguably misconstrues the meaning of the
term "absolute" in the new statute. The new statute states that the motor
vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions "are absolute waivers
of sovereign immunity whether or not the public entity was functioning in
a...
governmental or proprietarycapacity and whether or not the public
entity is covered by a liability insurancefor tort.' ' 2' This language suggests
that "absolute" means simply without regard to whether the defendant was
acting in a governmental capacity and without regard to the defendant's
insurance coverage.
Another reading of the term "absolute" is encompassed by the second
possible interpretation of Section 537.610. Under this interpretation, the motor vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions are absolute in
the sense that they apply whether or not the public entity has procured
insurance. 22 However, liablity in cases where these exceptions apply is limited
118. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.2 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
119. See Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
("Where there are two acts on one subject, both should be given effect if possible,
but if they are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, even sans a specific
repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the first."); See
also In re Estate of Patterson, 652 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
120. Bartley, 649 S.W.2d at 867 (citing State v. Kraus, 530 S.W.2d 684, 685
(Mo. 1975)).
121. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.2 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
122. References to insurance in this discussion should be read as including
"any self-insurance plan duly adopted by the governing body of any political subdivision of the state." Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610.1 (1978).
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to the amount of insurance coverage' or, if there is no insurance, to
$800,000. 124
This second interpretation relies on a reading of the statute in which the
first two subsections of Section 537.610 act independently: subsection one
applies where the defendant has procured insurance, and subsection two
applies where the defendant has not. This is inconsistent with the Bartley
ruling which stated that these two subsections are redundant. 25 However,
this interpretation is to be favored over Bartley's, since it should not be
presumed that any part of a statute is meaningless if such a result can be
avoided.

26

The narrow reading of "absolute" employed in the first interpretation
explained above'2 7 is also followed in the third possible reading of Section
537.610. The idea that Sections 537.600 and 537.610 operate independently
is central to this interpretation. It can be argued that since the motor vehicle
and dangerous condition of property exceptions now apply regardless of
insurance coverage, this new statute and Section 537.610 should be read and
interpreted entirely separately. In other words, it should be concluded that
the legislature has rejected Bartley's view that the two statutes are interde2

pendent.

1

Although Section 537.610 does not modify Section 537.600, under this
reading the older statue still has a meaning. Thus, this third interpretation
does not encompass repeal by implication. Instead, it can be concluded that
the $800,000 limits on liability which are mentioned in Section 537.610 apply
to a third exception-a waiver by insurance exception which the statute itself
creates. In sum, under this third interpretation, there are three exceptions to
123. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610.1 (1978) ("Sovereign immunity ... is
waived only to the maximum amount of ... such policy of insurance purchased
pursuant to the provisions of this section and in such amount ... provided in any
self-insurance plan .
").
124. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610.2 (1978) ("The liability of the state and
its public entities on claims within the scope of sections 537.600 to 537.650 shall not
exceed eight hundred thousand dollars .... ").
One problem with this interpretation is that it would allow the unreasonable
result of permitting a governmental entity to limit its liability under Section 537.600
to a nominal amount by procuring only minimal insurance coverage. See infra notes
131-32 and accompanying text.
125. Bartley, 649 S.W.2d at 869. ("[T]he plain fact is that regardless of what
construction is placed on § 536.610(2), it remains circumlocutory in relation to
.

§ 537.610(1) . .

").

126. See Brown Group v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n., 649 S.W.2d 874,
881 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) ("[A]II provisions of a statute must be harmonized and
every word, clause, sentence and section must be given some meaning.").
127. That is, "absolute" means that amount of liability under the motor vehicle
and dangerous condition of property exceptions is not limited in any way by Section
537.610 or any other provision.
128. Bartley, 649 S.W.2d at 868.
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sovereign immunity created by Sections 537.600 and 537.610. Section 537.600
(the "new statute") provides for the motor vehicle and dangerous condition
of property exceptions. These exceptions are "absolute," i.e., they are not
limited in any way by insurance coverage or as to amount of liability. Section
537.610 (the "old statute") provides the third exception. It occurs when the
State of Missouri or its political subdivisions purchase insurance or when a
political subdivision of the state adopts a plan of self-insurance. This third
exception is limited to the amount of insurance which may not exceed

$800,000. 129
Support exists for the three foregoing interpretations of Section 537.610.
Nevertheless it is the fourth interpretation which is the most reasonable and
which should be adopted by the Missouri courts. 30 This interpretation is
premised on the idea that in amending Section 537.600, the legislature sought
to reject the Bartley opinion. Courts should view this amendment as an
opportunity to reevaluate the meaning of Section 537.610 without the encumbrance of the Bartley ruling.
Under this interpretation, the second subsection of Section 537.610 limits
liability under the motor vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions to $800,000. Additionally, Section 537.610.1 creates a third exception, one that is applicable whenever the state and its political subdivisions
procure insurance or when the governing body of any political subdivision
of the state duly adopts a plan of self-insurance. 3 '
This interpretation relies on the most reasonable reading of the term
"absolute" as used in Section 537.600, i.e., that the application of the motor
vehicle and dangerous condition of property exceptions are not affected in
any way by insurance coverage. That is to say that these exceptions apply
to all defendants to the same extent, regardless of the existance of or the
amount of insurance coverage. Thus, just as a public entity can no longer
avoid these exceptions by failing to insure against them, neither can the entity
limit its liability by insuring itself for only a nominal amount.
Certainly it should not be assumed that the legislature intended to permit
public entities to limit their liability under Section 537.600 by using the option
129. Note that under this interpretation, as under the interpretation given this
statute by Bartley, the first two subsections of Section 537.610 are redundant. See
Bartley, 649 S.W.2d at 869.
130. See State ex rel McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) ("[W]e presume that the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law and
we favor a construction that avoids unjust or unreasonable results.") (citation omitted); see also 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (N. Singer
4th ed. 1984 rev.) ("It is said to be a 'well established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible construction."') (footnote omitted).
131. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610.1, .610.2 (1978).
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of insuring for a nominal amount.'3 2 Moreover, it should not be assumed
that the legislature intended to limit liability to the amount of insurance
coverage only where the public entity has procured a reasonable amount of
insurance coverage, since there is nothing in the statutes to suggest what
amount of coverage should be considered reasonable. Instead, the only limitation on the liability of a public entity for torts arising from the operation
of motor vehicles and dangerous conditions of property should be found in
the $800,000 cap of the second subsection of Section 537.610.
It should be noted that Sections 537.610.2 and 537.600 both use the
term "public entity.""' The first subsection of 537.610, on the other hand,
uses the term "political subdivisions" of the state.' 34 The use of these terms
suggests that an interrelationship exists between the new statute and the
second subsection of the old statute, and that no such interrelationship exists
between the new statute and Section 537.610.1.' 35
A second consideration which weighs in favor of this interpretation is
that it gives meaning to all the language of Sections 537.600 and 537.610.136
Furthermore, this interpretation avoids the unreasonable result of repeal by
implication.'3 7 In sum, this interpretation makes the most sense-it does not
rely on any linguistic contortions or illogical presumptions. It merely relies
on the plain language of the statutes. Thus, this fourth interpretation should
followed by the Missouri courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion can be summarized by a series of questions.
These questions, when answered in light of the cases and statutes discussed,
132. See State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) ("[W]e favor a construction that avoids unjust or unreasonable results.");
Tribune Publishing Co. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 661 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) ("It is assumed that the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute is
to serve the best interests and welfare of the citizenry at large. This assumption must
strike a proper balance with the further assumption that the legislature did not intend
to effect an unreasonable, oppressive or absurd result.") (citations omitted).
133. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.610.2 (1978) ("[t]he liability of the state and
its public entities ") (emphasis added); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1985) ("the
immunity of the public entity") (emphasis added); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.2 (Supp.
1985) ("[W]hether or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or
proprietary capacity and whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability
insurance") (emphasis added).
134. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.610.1 (1978) ("tort claims made against the
state or the political subdivision"; "Sovereign immunity for the state of Missouri
and its political subdivisions is waived.").
135. See Bartley v. Special School Dist., 649 S.W.2d 864, 872 (Mo. 1983) (en
banc) (Wasserstrom, Special Judge, dissenting).
136. See Brown Group v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 649 S.W.2d 874,
881 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) ("[AIIl provisions of a statute must be harmonized and
every word, clause, sentence and section must be given some meaning.").
137. A repeal by implication is an unfavored result. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
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indicate whether a particular case should be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Missouri:
1. Is the suit: (1) a tort action, (2) for money damages, (3) against a
public entity-an entity created by the legislature for purposes of public
policy? If any of these three elements is not present, the case should not be
barred by sovereign immunity, but continue with this analysis to find additional exceptions which may apply. If all these elements are present, proceed
to question 2.
2. Is the entity a municipality capable of exercising both governmental
and proprietary functions? If so, did the alleged tortious action occur as the
result of the exercise of a proprietary function? If it did, then the action should
not be barred by sovereign immunity. Continue with this analysis to determine if any of the statutory exceptions also apply in your case. If the defendant is a municipality and the suit arose from the exercise of a governmental
function, proceed to question 3. If the defendant is not a municipality, proceed to question 4.
3. Is the defendant a municipality within the meaning of Section 71.185?
If so, is the defendant covered by liability insurance for the excercise of the
governmental function which caused the plaintiff's injuries? If so, then the
defendant has waived its sovereign immunity to the extent of the liability
insurance so carried. Continue through this analysis to find additional exceptions which may apply. If the defendant is not a municipality under this
statute, or if the defendant was not insured, proceed to question 4.
4. Did the action arise out of a dangerous condition of public property
or the governmental operation of a motor vehicle, as defined by Section
537.600? If so, the action should not be barred by sovereign immunity although the amount of recovery may be limited by Section 537.610. Continue
with this analysis to find additional exceptions which may apply. If the action
did not arise from one of these situations, proceed to question 5.
5. Is the entity covered by liability insurance for its alleged tortious
action? If so, an argument can be made that under Section 537.610 the
defendant's sovereign immunity has been waived. If not, and none of the
preceeding questions has indicated that the action will not be barred, then
the action should be barred by sovereign immunity.
This series of questions is illustrated by the following flow chart:
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Barred by Sovereign
Immunity*

Barred by Sovereign
Immunity*

Barred by Sovereign
Immunity*

Barred by Sovereign
Immunity*

Probably Not Barred by
Sovereign Immunity

Action Barred by Sovereign Immunity
*continue through flow-chart to find additional exceptions which may apply
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Thus, despite much ambiguity in the law of sovereign immunity in Missouri and the many sources of this doctrine, a systematic framework for
analyzing sovereign immunity problems can be applied. Unfortunately, as
this Comment illustrates, each step of this analysis contains numerous issues
which defy simple resolution. The legislature has recently taken the first step
in eliminating some of the confusion in this area by amending Section 537.600.
It is to be hoped that the courts can further this initiative toward simplifying
the law of sovereign immunity in Missouri by adopting a reasonable interpretation of Section 537.610.
CAROLE LEWIS ILES
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